Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943): A Landmark Defense of Constitutional Rights Against Governmental Overreach
The 1943 Supreme Court decision in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, stands as a resounding affirmation of the principle that constitutional rights are not subject to governmental taxation, licensing, or regulatory burdens that effectively convert rights into privileges. At its heart, the case involved Jehovah’s Witnesses who were engaged in door-to-door evangelism, distributing religious literature and requesting donations. The borough of Jeannette, Pennsylvania, required a solicitation license—available only upon payment of a fee—for such activity. Murdock, representing the Jehovah’s Witnesses, refused to pay the fee, asserting that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protected their religious outreach without governmental interference. When Murdock was convicted for his refusal, the case ultimately reached the U.S. Supreme Court. By a narrow 5–4 majority, the Court reversed Murdock’s conviction, delivering a crucial opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas that has shaped the contours of First Amendment protections ever since.
Justice Douglas’s majority opinion struck decisively at the heart of the issue: the government cannot impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution. He made a sharp distinction between activities that are commercial in nature and activities that involve fundamental rights, such as religious expression. Douglas argued that even minimal taxes or fees levied upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms amount to an impermissible restriction. It is not sufficient, he emphasized, that a fee is small or imposed generally; the very act of placing a financial condition upon a constitutional right is inherently unconstitutional. Notably, Douglas wrote, “A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution.” This became a defining declaration of constitutional law. In siding with Murdock and striking down the Jeannette ordinance, the Court reinforced the principle that rights enshrined in the Constitution must remain unencumbered by governmental financial barriers, no matter how minor or neutrally applied they appear.
The dissenting opinion, written by Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone and joined by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson, took a markedly different view. The dissenters contended that the licensing ordinance was neutral, applying equally to all solicitors—commercial and religious alike—and was intended to protect citizens’ privacy and prevent fraudulent solicitations. Stone warned that the Court’s majority opinion might inadvertently open the door to widespread exemptions from neutral, reasonable regulations whenever religious motivation was claimed, potentially leading to a breakdown in the government's ability to manage orderly conduct in public spaces. Yet despite these concerns, the majority prevailed, establishing a precedent that would deeply influence subsequent First Amendment jurisprudence. The case stands for the proposition that religious activities, and by extension other constitutionally protected activities, must remain free from governmental fees, taxes, or licensing schemes that operate as prior restraints or economic burdens on the exercise of fundamental rights.
The legal and societal impact of Murdock v. Pennsylvania has been profound and enduring. The decision significantly bolstered the principle that the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment, applies with full force to actions by state and local governments, not merely to the federal government. Furthermore, it clarified that religious expression encompasses more than belief; it includes outward activities like preaching and disseminating religious literature. Courts in later years cited Murdock to defend the rights of individuals and religious groups against licensing schemes, sales taxes, and regulatory fees that could otherwise chill constitutional freedoms. Beyond religion, Murdock established a broader warning to governmental bodies: that no fundamental constitutional right—whether speech, assembly, petition, or religious exercise—may be subordinated to financial conditions imposed by the state. In this way, the decision has stood as a powerful shield for liberty against both overt and subtle forms of governmental intrusion.
Applying the core principles of Murdock v. Pennsylvania to the right to travel freely, particularly in the context of operating an automobile for personal, non-commercial use, reveals significant constitutional implications. Like the freedom of religion, the right to travel is a fundamental constitutional right, repeatedly affirmed in cases such as Crandall v. Nevada (1868), Kent v. Dulles (1958), and Shapiro v. Thompson (1969). If, as Murdock teaches, the government cannot impose a financial burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, then compelling citizens to obtain licenses, pay registration fees, or carry state-mandated insurance merely to travel in their private automobiles—when not engaged in commerce—could be argued to violate that fundamental right. The distinction is crucial: while the government may regulate commercial transportation under its police powers, private travel for personal reasons falls within the domain of unalienable rights. Thus, under the logic of Murdock, the licensing and taxing of private travel could be seen as an unconstitutional encroachment upon personal liberty, and therefore unlawful under the supreme law of the land.
